Comments are off for this post

Kiddush HaShem and Chillul HaShem

In this article, Rabbi Jack Bieler argues that the purpose of Jewish life is the sanctification of God’s name.


 

Are Pursuing “Kiddush HaShem” (the Sanctification of God’s ‘Name’) and Avoiding “Chilul HaShem” (the Profanation of God’s ‘Name’) Two Sides of a Meta-Principle of Judaism?

By: R. Yaakov Bieler
MarCheshvan 5776

Wondering how to classify central concepts in the Jewish tradition that have not been designated as “fundamental principles of the Torah.”

In the past several years, I have been seeking those aspects of Judaism that I categorize as “meta-principles.” I have defined this term as representing Jewish values and practices that define Judaism as a unique religion and weltanschauung. My recent book, The Great Principle of the Torah: Examining Seven Talmudic Claims to the Defining Principles of Judaism (Kodesh Press, 2016) is devoted to exploring several ideas of this type that various authorities in the Oral Tradition have said in one form or another that they represent the “keys” to the Jewish religion. However, once a methodology is established by which these principles can be identified, a different question presents itself, i.e., how should we classify those concepts that have not earned in the eyes of comparable authorities such an exalted classification? Does that mean that they are to be considered inferior to principles that have been designated as such by one great Rabbinic personality or another?

Is “Sanctifying/not Profaning God’s Name” a Jewish meta-principle?

An example of such a concept and value is known by its positive and negative forms—“Kiddush HaShem” and “Chilul HaShem.” The Torah verse that is cited as the source for this Mitzva is:

   Leviticus 22:32
   And (Chilul HaShem) ye shall not profane My Holy Name; but (Kiddush HaShem)
   I will Be Hallowed among the children of Israel: I Am the LORD Who Hallow you.

Classical commentators apply this verse to several different contexts (A reversal of each of these categories, i.e. from Chilul to Kiddush, or from Kiddush to Chilul, will generate the converse of each of these interpretations)[1]:

  1. + 2. RashI—Transgressing any Tora prohibition deliberately[2] constitutes a “Chillul HaShem.”
    •    mindfully fulfilling a Tora Commandment devoid of ulterior motive is a “Kiddush HaShem.”

    Giving up one’s life for the sake of Judaism, without even entertaining the hope that a miracle will be performed to save one’s life, is a “Kiddush HaShem.”

    •  not being prepared to make such an ultimate sacrifice for one’s religion when called upon to do so, is a “Chilul HaShem.”
  1. Sephorno—If one is known to be an observant person, yet he engages in meaningless and disgusting activities, he causes a “Chilul HaShem.”
    •   making sure that an observant peron involve himself exclusively in meaningful, proper activities, is a “Kiddush HaShem.”
  2. R. Shimshon Rafael Hirsch—Every refusal to engage in a requisite sacrifice either of our bodies, e.g., time, energy, etc., or our possessions, is considered a “Chilul HaShem.”
    •   sacrificing the things that are dearest to us for the sake of God is a “Kiddush HaShem.”

Fleshing out the concept by reflecting upon specific cases with which this terminology is invoked in the bible.

The biblical text provides additional examples of Commandments whose fulfillment or violation is deemed to constitute either a “Kiddush HaShem” or a “Chilul HaShem”, all of them having to do with either 1) sacrifices, or 2) the invocation of God’s Name for objectionable purposes, a more restricted conception of the terms than implied by the commentaries on Leviticus 22:32 listed above:

  1. Leviticus 18:21 “And thou shalt not give any of thy seed to set them apart to Molech (the prohibition against child sacrifice), neither shalt thou profane the Name of thy God: I Am the LORD.
  2. Ibid. 19:12 “And ye shall not swear by My Name falsely, so that thou profane the Name of thy God: I Am the LORD.
  3. Ibid. 21:6; 22:2 “6 They shall be holy unto their God, and not profane the Name of their God; for the offerings of the LORD made by fire, the bread of their God, they do offer; therefore they shall be holy.” “2 Speak unto Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves from the holy things of the children of Israel, which they hallow unto Me, and that they profane not My Holy Name: I Am the LORD.”

Had only cases a) and c) been mentioned, one could have concluded that these categories specifically apply to Kohanim (priests) who engage in sacrificial rituals in one form or another. The inclusion of b) which could pertain to anyone either within the confines of a courtroom or without, suggests that “Kiddush”/”Chilul” HaShem potentially could be the concern of anyone practicing the Jewish religion; however uttering God’s Name appears to be a very specific context that not everyone would be required to enter, certainly not on a regular basis.[3]

The Talmud in four separate passages, exemplifies “Chilul HaShem” and “Kiddush HaShem” as functions of how an individual, known to be learned and observant, makes impressions upon and interacts with others, closely resembling Sephorno’s view, 3), listed above.

  1. Yomah 86a
    What constitutes profanation of the Name? —

    1. Rav said: If, e.g., I take meat for the butcher and do not pay him at once.
      • Abaye said: That we have learnt (to regard as profanation) only in place wherein one does not go out to collect payment (it is not accepted practice to buy and sell on credit), but in a place where one does not go out to collect (people do engage in a credit system), there is no harm in it (not paying at once).
      • avina said: And Mata Mechasia is a place where one goes out collecting payments due.
      • Whenever Abaye bought meat from two partners, he paid money to each of them, afterwards bringing then, together and squaring accounts with both.
        • Less than admirable and socially acceptable financial and economic practices = “Chilul HaShem”,[4] therefore, taking the “high road” in financial and economic contexts create “Kiddush HaShem”.
    2. R. Yochanan said: In my case (it is a profanation if) I walk four cubits without (uttering words of) Torah or (wearing) Tefillin.
      • Not living up to religious standards or expectations = “Chilul HaShem”,[5] therefore consistently maintaining high standards achieves “Kiddush HaShem”.
    3. Yitzchak, of the School of R. Yannai. said: If one’s colleagues are ashamed of his reputation, that constitutes a profanation of the Name.
      • R. Nachman b. Yitzchak commented: E.g., if people say: May the Lord Forgive So-and-So.
        • Actions that cause others to be embarrassed = “Chilul HaShem”,[6] consequently causing others to be proud to be your acquaintance due to admirable ethical, moral and religious principles constitutes a “Kiddush HaShem”.
    4. Abaye explained: As it was taught: (Deuteronomy 6:5) “And thou shalt love the Lord thy God”, i.e., that the Name of Heaven be beloved because of you. if someone studies Scripture and Mishna, and attends on the disciples of the wise, is honest in business, and speaks pleasantly to persons, what do people then say concerning him? “Happy the father who taught him Torah; happy the teacher who taught him Torah; woe unto people who have not studied the Torah; for this man has studied the Torah look how fine his ways are, how righteous his deeds! Of him does Scripture say: (Isaiah 49:3) “And He said unto me: Thou art My Servant, Israel, in, whom I will Be Glorified. (Kiddush HaShem.)
      But if someone studies Scripture and Mishnah, attends on the disciples of the wise, but is dishonest in business, and discourteous in his relations with people, what do people say about him? “Woe unto him who studied the Torah; woe unto his father who taught him Torah; woe unto his teacher who taught him Torah! This man studied the Torah: Look, how corrupt are his deeds, how ugly his ways. Of him Scripture says: (Ezekial 36:20) “In that men said of them: These are the people of the Lord, and are gone forth out of His Land.” (Chllul HaShem.)

      • This lengthy comment explicates both sides of the issue, i.e., “Kiddush HaShem” as well as “Chilul HaShem” in terms of the overall deportment, particularly with respect to interpersonal interactions, of an individual who has the reputation of being learned and observant.
  2. Yomah 86b
    One should expose hypocrites to prevent the profanation of the Name, as it is said: (Ezekial 3:20) “Again, when a righteous man doth turn from righteousness. and commit iniquity, I will lay a stumbling-block before him.”

    • Evil-doers who portray themselves as righteous = “Chilul HaShem” when they are finally exposed for what they are, consequently, a person who maintains “Tocho KeBoro” (his internal thoughts are entirely consistent with the outer impression that he projects) will live a life of “Kiddush HaShem”.
  3. Moed Katan 17a

    Said R. Huna: At (one of the Synods at) Usha they made a regulation that if the Av Beit Din (the leader of a Rabbinical court, a role usually reserved for a distinguished individual) committed an offence, he was not to be (formally) “separated” (placed under the “ban”), but someone was to tell him: “Save your dignity and remain at home.”

    Should he again offend they “separate” him, because (otherwise there would be) a profanation of the Name (of God).

    And this is at variance with Reish Lakish; for Reish Lakish said: If a scholar-disciple has committed an offensive deed (even for a second time) they do not “separate” him publicly, because it is said: (Hosea 4:5) “Therefore shalt thou stumble in the day and the prophet also shall stumble with thee in the night,”—(that is to say), keep it “dark”, like night.

    • Individuals in religious leadership roles, as well as those who have public reputations as scholars, should they act badly = “Chilul HaShem” has been committed, implying that if these people who have achieved acknowledged high standing religiously act well, it is considered a “Kiddush HaShem”. (The disagreement between R. Huna and Reish Lakish is the extent to which such “dirty laundry” should be aired in public, since it is not only the individual who will be censured, but also the institution with which he is associated.)
  4. Bavah Kammah 113b

    His (that of a heathen) lost article is permissible, (one does not have to return it in accordance with the Torah principle articulated in Exodus 22:1 since it does not apply to heathens)  for R. Hamah b. Guria said that Rab stated: Whence can we learn that the lost article of a heathen is permissible (i.e., does not have to be returned to the owner)?  Because it says: (Deuteronomy 22:3) “And with all lost thing of thy brother’s”–it is to your brother that you make restoration, but you need not make restoration to a heathen…

    It was taught: R. Pinchas b. Yair said that where there was a danger of causing a profanation of the Name,  even the retaining of a lost article of a heathen is a crime.

    • “Chilul HaShem” is contextual and a function of time and place, suggesting that the converse, i.e., “Kiddush HaShem” is similarly contextual.

Discussion.

The seven “meta-principles”[7] that are referred to in Rabbinic literature as “keys” to the practice of Judaism and discussed in The Great Principle of the Torah, could be categorized into two overall groups, i.e., those that deal with interpersonal relationships, and those which focus upon how an individual relates to God:

Between man and man

  1. Do not do to others what you do not wish them to do to you.
  2. Respect your fellow man because he has been Created in the Image of God.
  3. Always act pleasantly.
  4. Engage in acts of kindness.
  5. Justice should inform all your actions.
Between man and God

  1. Believe in God.
  2. Awareness of God should inform all of your actions.

However, no attention seems to have been given as to what the true purpose of man’s existence is. Putting the dichotomy colloquially, whereas the “meta-principles” constitute manifestations of “how,” they do not address the question “why?” One can claim that the point of Judaism has been missed when one or more of the keys are not obviously informing how a person goes about his day-to-day life; yet why is it important that one should sacrifice to embody such ideas throughout his conscious activities altogether? I would posit that the idea that ties together all of the myriad details that comprise the corpus of a Tora life is the “Kiddush HaShem”/”Chilul HaShem” dichotomy. This then is not a “meta-principle” but rather the ultimate “point” of a Tora lifestyle.

Many have discussed how an important means by which a person can justify his existence is by living not for himself, but rather for others. A marriage partner does so for a spouse, a parent for a child, a service professional for his clients, etc. Many years ago, when I was a Yeshiva student, I began to study RaMChaL’s classical work, Mesilat Yesharim. I found the book extremely disconcerting in the sense that the author, to instill humility in the reader, instructs him to find fault with all that he does and to admit how inadequate are even that which he carries out with the best of intentions. Upon discussing my extreme discomfort with what I was learning with the Mashgiach Ruchani, essentially the resident school psychologist of a traditional Tora institution, he pointed out that in ethical thought there are two basic approaches: 1) “Shmira Atzmit” (taking care of yourself), i.e., striving for personal refinement and perfection, and 2) “Asiya LeZulat” (doing things on behalf of others.) He noted that the first approach is never-ending and can be quite detrimental to some personalities if it is taken too much to heart. It can be upsetting to continually be told that you are so much less than you are striving to be, that all your efforts will ultimately prove ineffective and even hypocritical. The second approach, on the other, diverts attention from yourself and places the emphasis upon how you can help another, in easing his pain, if not improving his situation. Paradoxically, as you help others, you also improve yourself, and it is a truism that many have said that their altruistic activities have had salutary effects on themselves even as they have extended themselves to needy individuals. For this reason, the Mashgiach recommended that I study ethical works that embodied the second approach, e.g., by R. Noson Tzvi Finkel (the Alter of Slobodka) and R. Simcha Ziesel of Kelm (the Alter of Kelm), in order for me to better maintain my spiritual equilibrium.

I would posit that a heightened sensitivity to “Kiddush HaShem”/”Chilul HaShem” reflects a commitment to be concerned with acting on behalf of the ultimate “Zulat,” God Himself. If every time a religious individual contributes to another’s decision to turn his back on the religious life, i.e., perpetrate a “Chilul HaShem,” God’s ultimate plans for civilization have been “set back” in some manner, and conversely, if some sort of deed minimally brings respect to the religious enterprise, and even better draws another into the orbit of his own heightened spiritual expression, i.e., the result of a “Kiddush HaShem,” it is not just another human being whose lot I have positively affected, but that of God Himself. While I personally appreciate the religious freedom that is a pillar of American society, encouraging all forms of personal spiritual expression, including deciding that one wishes religion to play no part in his life, I well recall the comment of a psychiatrist many years ago, to the effect that he considered an analysis successful if at the end of his interactions with a patient, that individual was “more religious” than when he began. Granted, that religion for some can deteriorate into fundamentalism, fanaticism and extreme intolerance. Yet a balanced, reflective and thoughtful religious experience can enhance one’s life by making him more morally sensitive and empathic, not only to himself and his fellow man, but to God as well. If partnering with God is a value of supreme religious importance
I have devoted a number of blog posts to this theme, e.g.,
https://yaakovbieler.wordpress.com/2015/10/21/partnering-with-god/
https://yaakovbieler.wordpress.com/2015/10/31/partnering-with-god-ii/
https://yaakovbieler.wordpress.com/2015/11/21/partnering-with-god-iii/
https://yaakovbieler.wordpress.com/2016/11/11/standing-prayer-of-confrontation-and-protest/
https://yaakovbieler.wordpress.com/2015/11/01/principles-of-shlichut-surrogacy-derived-from-eliezer-in-parashat-chayei-sara/
https://yaakovbieler.wordpress.com/2016/11/13/to-be-a-partner-with-hashem-means-to-pursue-righteousness-and-justice/
https://yaakovbieler.wordpress.com/2016/11/14/partnering-with-god-within-the-context-of-food-preparation-and-consumption/)
then per force pursuing “Kiddush HaShem” and avoiding as much as possible “Chilul HaShem” are of the highest religious orders.


[1] The process by which a positive is used to determine the negative (and vice versa) is employed by the Talmud to delineate the curses by which Bila’am wished to condemn the Jewish people. Even though only blessings issued from this prophet’s mouth—see Numbers 23:1-24:9–, he had been hired by Balak to spiritually attack the Jewish people—Ibid. 22:6 ff. According to the bible, it was HaShem Who miraculously Caused blessings rather than curses to emanate from Bila’am’s mouth: (Deuteronomy 23:6) “Nevertheless the LORD thy God would not Hearken unto Bila’am; but the LORD thy God Turned the curse into a blessing unto thee, because the LORD thy God Loved thee.” Sanhedrin 105b presents two possibilities regarding how this was done, i.e., (R. Eleazar) either an angel placed within him, and not Bila’am himself, actually uttered the words, or (R. Yonatan) the voice was that of the prophet, but his words were altered into the opposite of his original intention, and with respect to the second view, the Talmud proceeds to outline what Bila’am truly intended to say had God not Intervened: Ibid.

Yochanan said: From the blessings of that wicked man you may learn his intentions:  Thus he wished to curse them—1) that they (the Israelites) should possess no synagogues or school-houses — (this is deduced from) (BaMidbar 24:5) “How goodly are thy tents, O Jacob”;  2) that the Shechina should not rest upon them — (Ibid.) “…and thy tabernacles, O Israel”;  3) that their kingdom should not endure — (Ibid. 6) “As the valleys are they spread forth”; 4) that they might have no olive trees and vineyards — (Ibid.) “as gardens by the river’s side”; 5) that their odor might not be fragrant — (Ibid.) “as the trees of lign aloes which the Lord hath planted”; 6) that their kings might not be tall — (Ibid.) “and as cedar trees beside the waters”; 7) that they might not have a king the son of a king —(Ibid. 7) “He shall pour the water out of his buckets”; 8) that their kingdom might not rule over other nations — (Ibid.) “and his seed shall be in many waters”; 9) that their kingdom might not be strong — (Ibid.) “and his king shall be higher than Agag”; 10) that their kingdom might not be awe-inspiring — (Ibid.) “and his kingdom shall be exalted.”

While the Talmud engages in this exercise only through Numbers 24:7, we can reasonably assume that it could have been extended to the complete set of blessings that Bila’am utters.

[2] This excludes transgressing because of 1) duress or 2) inadvertently. While regarding 1), the Rabbis state: “Ones Rachmana Patrei” (if something is violated under duress, the individual is considered fully exempt), with respect to 2), some additional action may be required in order to gain atonement, e.g., offering a sin or guilt offering. Nevertheless, such a transgression would not be considered a “Chilul HaShem.”

[3] The Talmud notes that the biblical figure Boaz, depicted by the Rabbis as the head of a Rabbinical court, brought about legislation that allowed for invoking God’s Name more frequently in all sorts of social settings:

Makot 23b
Yehoshua b. Levi said that three things were enacted by the (mundane) Tribunal below and the (Celestial) Tribunal on high gave assent to their action. These were: The (annual) recital of the Scroll [of Esther]; saluting with the Divine Name; and the (Levite’s) tithe to be brought (to the Temple-chamber) …

“Saluting with the Divine Name” — as it is written: (Ruth 2:4) “And behold, Boaz came from Bethlehem and said to the reapers: The Lord be with you.” And (furthermore) it says: (Judges 6:3) “The Lord bless thee, thou mighty man of valor.” (Since this second verse is thought to have occurred at a later point than the first, its literal sense is that this is an indication that Boaz’ practice had become accepted among the Jewish people. The Talmud however interprets the verse in Judges differently.) What is the purport of “And (furthermore) it says”? — Lest you should say that Boaz did this of his own idea and that this action of his was not approved by Heaven, come and hear what it says: “The Lord Be with thee, thou mighty man of valor (taken as a reference to Boaz).” …

MaLBIM on Rut 2:4 explains:

…ChaZaL have said that Boaz and his Rabbinic court legislated that it was permitted to invoke the Name of God when greeting another… because generally one should not mention God’s Name in vain…However, when they saw that among the members of the society there was an increase in thievery… and people were not taking seriously their judges…they legislated that God’s Name should be used in social greetings in order to establish in their hearts that HaShem was Looking down from Heaven upon them and the state of their society, with the peace of civilization partnering with Divine Supervision to the point where God, one of Whom’s secondary names is “Shalom” (peace) joins together with the peace between one person and another, as well as an awareness that HaShem Is before them constantly, even with respect to personal matters between them and their acquaintances, and the pursuit of peace and a state of goodness…

The commentator essentially views a pendulum phenomenon with respect to the invocation of the Name of God outside the context of oaths taken in court. On the one hand, there is a concern that “familiarity will breed contempt” and that regularly mentioning God’s Name will deprive it of all respect and holiness; yet, when God “is removed” from everyday social discourse, due to His Abstract Nature, He Becomes less part of human consciousness, which has its detrimental aspects as well. Consequently, Boaz saw fit to return to greater awareness of HaShem’s Presence, which also has the potential for increased instances of Chilul HaShem, i.e., invoking God’s Name in vain.

[4] An intriguing “grey area” of such a category is when someone does something that is “legal,” but appears to not be in the “spirit of the law,” e.g., relying upon legal loopholes to avoid paying taxes. Would such conduct at worst be a violation of the value of “Lifnim MiShurat HaDin” (going beyond the letter of the law), something that admittedly is the purview of only the very righteous, or should it be generalized to apply to a broader swath of individuals, and if so, to whom?

[5] In this case, the ambiguity occurs when the question arises as to who is expected to conduct himself in accordance with this “higher standard” of spirituality—only the elite, perhaps the “professional Jews” such as Rabbis and day school educators—are there even distinctions to be made among these individuals, with some being held to higher standards than others–, or again everyone, each per his own level and achievement. But then the onlookers, who while should not be judgmental, inevitably are, will be hard-pressed to know exactly where the person that they are observing “is at.”

[6] One question that arises within this definition concerns the observation that different individuals possess varying thresholds of embarrassment, including some that could be deemed totally unreasonable. Such distinctions are acknowledged by the Talmud when it considers how financial compensation is to be computed in the case of one person having humiliated another:

Bavah Kammah 86a
Mishnah: “Embarrassment”—All is to be estimated in accordance with the status of the offender and the offended… (After an involved discussion trying to determine in accordance with which Tannah this Mishnah is stated, the Gemorah arrives at the conclusion that it is R. Simeon, who rendered the following opinion in a Baraita🙂

R. Simeon says that wealthy persons will be considered merely as if they were freemen who have become impoverished (it is assumed that someone who was accustomed to privileged status and suddenly finds himself impoverished will be more sensitive to humiliation than an individual who is likely to ignore such acts due to the security of his status), whereas the poor will all be put on the level of the least among them. (Consequently, if a poor person will insult a wealthy one, the monetary value of such an insult will be deemed high, whereas if a wealthy person insults a poor individual, since the poorest of individuals is used to such treatment, the value will not be set all that high.)
(In a subsequent Mishnah, R. Akiba protects poor individuals from being taken advantage of in this regard by the wealthy:)

Ibid. 90b

Mishnah: R. Akiba said that even the poor in Israel have to be considered as if they are freemen reduced in circumstances (and therefore deserving of maximum compensation were they to be humiliated) for in fact they all are descendants of Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov. It once happened that a certain person uncovered the head of a woman in the market place and when she came before R. Akiba, he ordered the offender to pay her four hundred Zuz. The latter said to him: Rabbi, allow me time (in which to carry out the judgment. R. Akiba assented and fixed a time for him. He watched her until he saw her standing outside the door of her courtyard. He then broke in her presence a pitcher where there was oil of the value of an Issar, and she uncovered her head and collected the oil with her palms and put her hands upon her head to anoint it. He then set up witnesses against her and came to R. Akiba, and said to him: I have to give such a woman four hundred Zuz? But R. Akiba said to him: Your argument is of no legal effect, for where one injured oneself, though forbidden, he is exempt. Yet were others to injure him, they would be liable; so also he who cuts down his own plants, though not acting lawfully, is exempt, yet were others to do it, they would be liable.

Must we posit that we are referring to the “average” universe of individuals, or should even those who are highly sensitive for any number of reasons be included in such a calculus?

[7] The seven are summarized by Professor Alan Brill in a recent review of my book (https://kavvanah.wordpress.com/2016/11/07/jack-bieler-the-great-principle-of-the-torah-and-discussion-of-dov-weiss-rav-shagar-jewish-education-and-modern-orthodoxy/ ) as follows:

  1. Love they neighbor- Hillel’s opinion that “What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor.” This is a variation of the biblical: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.”
  2. Universalism- Ben Azzai focused on the biblical statement “This is the book of the generations of man in the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made he him.”
  3. The concept of ever more concise Principles- prophet Habakkuk wrote “But the righteous shall live by his faith.”
  4. Everyday Consciousness -Bar Kappa’s “In all your ways know him and he will direct your paths.”
  5. Pleasantness and Peace- Rabbi Joseph “Her ways are ways of pleasantness and all her paths are peace.”
  6. Loving-kindness- Rabbi Yehudah emphasized kindness, for one who denies it “denies the most fundamental principle.”
  7. Lawfulness- Rabbi Elazar said: “The entire Torah is based upon justice.”