In this article, originally published on the Torah Musings website, I use social science literature and Torah sources to suggest why many Jews are more punctilious about mitzvot between man and God than they are with interpersonal mitzvot.

Introduction

In a well-known joke, a yeshiva bocher finds that his milk cartons are routinely stolen from the yeshiva dorm fridge by one of his fellow students. After unsuccessful attempts to deter the thief by writing on the carton that stealing is a Torah prohibition, the milk owner has a brainwave and writes in big letters ‘NOT CHOLOV YISROEL’! The next day, no milk is stolen from the fridge and the problem is solved.

I thought of this joke whilst listening to an interesting shiur by the distinguished Rabbi Yisrael Reisman who discusses the impact of a halakhic consciousness on the self-control and behavior of observant Jews. R Reisman argues that, when frum Jews are confronted with a choice, their decision is more strongly influenced by halakhic considerations than mussar considerations. In an amusing and insightful example, he presents the scenario of a person seeing a delicious dessert at a wedding, hesitating before eating it because of health concerns, but opting to eat it anyway. The person then observes a sign which says the cake is not Kosher. As soon as the person sees that sign, there is nothing to think about! He is certainly not going to eat the cake. Halakha (not health or self-control) is the decisive consideration. This point is well-taken but I am more intrigued by a second anecdote brought in favor of the thesis.

R Reisman relates (48 minutes into the lecture) that Yeshivas Torah Ohr had the policy that breakfast may not be taken from the yeshiva dining room after 9am. Despite this policy, students were taking breakfast after this time so the Rosh Yeshiva, Rabbi Chaim Pinchas Sheinberg, posted on the wall that anyone who does so should not make a brakha on their food as the halakha is that one does not make a brakha on stolen food. The strategy succeeded, the students observed the curfew and R Reisman brings this as further evidence of the effect that awareness of halakhic requirement has on frum Jews.

But there is a subtlety here that R Reisman doesn’t acknowledge. To take food from the yeshiva without permission is stealing – a clear violation of Jewish law! As with the milk thief in the joke, publicizing that the yeshiva does not give permission to take the food was clearly not enough of a deterrent. R Sheinberg was only successful in stopping the theft when he highlighted how the stealing had an impact in the area of bein adam leMakom (as the food is stolen, a brakha is not said and who can eat food without a brakha?!).¹

With all the routine (and important) caveats about outstanding ethical personalities in the frum world and wonderful interpersonal behavior in the Orthodox community, I submit that much empirical experience supports a more nuanced thesis than that proposed by R Reisman. Observant Jews do adhere with remarkable punctiliousness to many halakhot but with other halakhot (including some aspects of interpersonal conduct), the commitment to halakhic compliance is often much lower.

The common laxity with regard to inappropriate business activity is recognized by the gemara² and the frequent negligence in mitzvot bein adam lechavero relative to bein adam leMakom is bemoaned by both the Chatam Sofer³ and Rabbi Yisrael Salanter.⁴

Why would this be so? Why do many halakhically committed Jews manifest their commitment so impressively in some areas of halakha but not in others? Below, I offer four complementary explanations.

A. Moral Licensing

Two years ago, Jean Decety and his co-researchers published data suggesting that children from religious households are less generous than those from secular backgrounds. (The research compared Christian, Muslim and non-religious children. The small number of Jewish children observed was not considered to be statistically significant.)

In explanation of the findings, Decety invokes the concept of moral licensing. Advocates of moral licensing explain that those who have done good deeds often feel liberated to engage in unethical behaviour which they would otherwise have avoided. The fact that they have other good deeds to their names allows them to behave inappropriately without feeling ashamed or immoral. In this vein, Decety suggests that a religious child who performs a positive religious act like praying may go on to do something immoral without feeling that this is incompatible with religious teachings.

Conceivably, this resembles the attitude of many halakhically committed Jews. Such a person must be cognizant of many laws relating to permissible conduct on Shabbat, saying the correct blessings over food, davening at the appropriate zmanei tefillah, observing taharat hamishpakha and much more. Perhaps the preoccupation and energy expended in compliance with so many areas of halakha “allow” many observant Jews to adopt a more relaxed attitude to interpersonal conduct, even when such conduct is the subject of halakhic obligation and prohibition.

But even if Decety’s speculations accurately describe the psychological processes of some Orthodox Jews, this doesn’t answer the question as to why it is mitzvot bein adam leMakom which are adhered to whilst mitzvot bein adam lechavero so often fall by the wayside.

B. Halakhic Ambiguity

I propose that one reason for this is that many prohibitions in the bein adam lechavero category require careful judgment to discern whether or not an issur applies. Whilst lashon hara is a terrible sin, it is permissible and even mandatory if it is said for an advantageous purpose, provided several other criteria are satisfied. Similarly, whilst lying is generally prohibited, there are all sorts of scenarios (e.g. when necessary to preserve peace) in which the Talmud and halakhic authorities deem it permitted and laudatory.

All this is in contrast to prohibitions such as eating non-Kosher food or wearing Sha’atnez which are only permitted in the most unusual and extreme circumstances (e.g. to save a life).

The significance of this is two-fold. Firstly, many decisions involving interpersonal conduct require careful judgement as to the appropriate halakhic behavior. It is not always practical to seek the advice of a posek in every situation and the individual is left to decide whether a given behavior is mandatory, best avoided or absolutely forbidden. In such a scenario, there is much room for rationalization.

Secondly, given the fact that there are times when halakhically committed Jews will, for valid reasons, speak about the wrongdoing of others and say things that are not true, the aversion to such behavior is lessened. Whilst the idea of eating pork is likely repugnant to someone who has been avoiding it throughout his life, lashon hara is less likely to be regarded in the same way by someone who has had to speak it, even if for halakhically valid reasons.

C. Middot and Mitzvot Bein Adam LeChavero

Another reason for lapses in mitzvot bein adam lechavero is that the development of good character is a prerequisite for the proper observance of these mitzvot. That appropriate middot are important in order to be able to observe the commandments properly is emphasised by Rabbi Chaim Vital (Shaarei Kedusha 1:2) and the Vilna Gaon (Even Sheleimah 1).

Whilst this is true of all mitzvot, the Mabit asserts that a person’s character flaws present a greater challenge to observance of mitzvot bein adam lechavero than mitzvot bein adam leMakom.

Indeed, a person who has a tendency to lose his temper will not necessarily be hindered in his observance of Shabbat, Kashrut, davening or learning but is likely to face great difficulty in avoiding making hurtful remarks (onaat devarim) or embarrassing someone in public.⁵ Similarly, a person who looks for the bad in people is likely to transgress the law against judging others unfavourably.

The same is true of avoiding lashon hara. As professor of psychology and education Aharon Hersh Fried has argued, proper education in Shemirat Halashon is predicated on teaching the importance of respecting others. If there is no sensitivity to this value, people ‘will not cease to find “ היתרים ” for speaking לשון הרע, if only for the most “juicy pieces.””⁶

D. Communal Standards

So, moral licensing and the discerning judgement and middot development necessary for proper observance of mitzvot bein adam lechavero provide some explanation of why so many fail in this area. But the tendency for a given individual to fail does not happen in a vacuum. When a laxity becomes commonplace, it affects the communal environment. And this in turn impacts on the attitudes of community members.

Robert Cialdini, considered by many to be the leading social scientist in the field of influence, has argued that ‘[w]e view a behavior as more correct in a given situation to the degree that we see others performing it.’⁷ More recently, he has argued that we are particularly influenced by the behavior of those with whom we feel a special affiliation, such as those with the same religion or ethnicity. This thesis has also been corroborated by research showing that we are more disposed toward unethical behavior when we see it practiced by those who consider to be part of our ‘in-group’.

This accords with a story told by Rabbi Reuven Feinstein in which one of his talmidim accidentally broke a borrowed tape recorder and claimed that he did not have to pay for the damage because ‘it was an accident’. The boy was, at that time, learning the sugya relating to one who borrows an item and accidentally damages it and the halakha that the borrower is responsible to pay in such circumstances. Rav Reuven consulted with his father, Rav Moshe, as to why the boy did not connect the incident with the tape recorder to the gemara he was learning. Rav Moshe explained that when students learn halakhot in gemara and then see that those halakhot are not being adhered to in their community, they learn that what they studied in the gemara is not something they need to apply to their own lives.⁸

This incident and analysis is a special case of a more general phenomenon in our communities. We learn through observing social norms that driving on Shabbat is totally off limits but speaking badly about others – to mention but one example – is acceptable. Our aspirations for self-improvement are lowered, even to levels below that required by halacha, when our community experience confirms that such standards are not considered essential for Orthodox life.

Conclusion

If these diagnoses are accurate, perhaps they can help us to understand how to raise the bar for ethical conduct so that it matches the many wonderful features of the Orthodox world and the remarkable self-control and commitment already exhibited in so many areas of halakhic life.

1. Similarly, the Mishnah (Nedarim 27b) permits lying to thieves by saying that the produce they wish to seize is terumah (which only Kohanim are permitted to eat). The Rosh explains that this ruling assumes that there are people who will be prepared to murder and steal but would not eat from forbidden foods!
2. Bava Batra 165a records Rav’s view that ‘most [are guilty of] theft. Rashbam explains that this refers to people making decisions in business which prevent one’s fellow from getting the profits to which he is entitled. Ramchal writes similarly in ch.11 of mesillat yesharim.
3. Derashot, p.245
4. Israel Salanter: Text, Structure, Idea. By Hillel Goldberg. , New York, Ktav, 1981, Pp. 78-9
5. For this explanation, I am indebted to Rabbi Yehonasan Geffen, Two Tablets – Va-eschanan
6. Aharon Hersh Fried, “Is There a Disconnect between Torah Learning and Torah Living? And If So, How Can We Connect Them? A Focus on Middos”, p.32 at http://www.hakirah.org/Vol%206%20Fried.pdf.
7. Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, 116
8. Aharon H Fried., “Are Our Children Too Worldly?” Hakirah, Vol. 4, Winter 2007, pp. 37–67. 51