In this article, I discuss why Orthodoxy might not yet be the gold standard for ethical behavior.

The Question

The contemporary philosopher, Eric Schwitzgebel recounts a conversation he had with two bishops at a conference. He asked them if they thought that Christian clergy, on average, behaved better, the same or worse than laypeople. One bishop replied that they are about the same whilst the other answered that clergy are worse!

Without limiting the conversation to members of the clergy, how would we answer the question if asked of Orthodox Jews? Do we behave better, the same or worse than those who don’t subscribe to Orthodox Judaism?

Whilst I already referenced in my first article scholarly research indicating Orthodox Jews’ impressive conduct in certain areas, Orthodox Jewry has not yet succeeded in setting the benchmark for ethically exemplary behaviour.

I want to explain why I think this is but, first, let me briefly clarify the purview of this article. I won’t be discussing if and why the Orthodox community is more particular in observing mitzvot bein adam leMakom than mitzvot bein adam lechavero. I will take on that issue in a future article. This piece will discuss people who are observant of halakha who nevertheless exhibit less than optimum ethical behaviour.

Another thing I won’t be discussing is whether Orthodox commitment can ever lead to a person being less ethically sensitive. Again, I will take on that topic in the future but, for now, I’m approaching the topic from a different angle: Why does Orthodox commitment not lead more often to ethical excellence?

In my last article, I discussed the importance of how we think and how we feel for the ethical personality. In this post, my primary focus will be on how we behave (though we will see that thoughts and feelings are very important in accounting for behaviour). Specifically, I try to explain why we don’t find more outstanding positive ethical behaviour in the Orthodox Jewish community.

Keeping Halakha But Not Being Ethical?

Some readers may have done a double take when reading one of my statements above. I referred to people who do keep halakha but whose ethical behaviour is wanting. Can one behave badly and still act within the confines of halakha?

In fact, as Prof. Marc Shapiro has noted, one of the most important themes in the writings of Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg is “the fact that there are people in the Orthodox community who, while completely halakhic, are ethically challenged.” Similarly, Rabbi Yuval Cherlow remarked in an interview last year that he encounters, not infrequently, people who are strictly observant about every clause in the Shulkhan Arukh, but are basically corrupt people!

Though the testimony is noteworthy, the idea that behaviour can be considered both technically permissible and reprehensible is already recognised by Hazal who consider (amongst other examples) taking a loaf that a poor person is about to pick up as wicked even though there is no halakhic violation.¹

A number of commentaries have followed the Ramban’s lead (Commentary to Devarim 6:18)² in explaining that halakha cannot provide specific instruction for every conceivable situation. There are many scenarios in which there will be no halakhic prescription and one needs to be guided by an awareness and understanding of Jewish ethical principles and derekh eretz.

But what if, as I have argued in the previous article and here, there is not enough sensitivity to broader ethical considerations? What if Jewish ethics is often viewed as completely co-extensive with halakha and the law’s minimum requirements are accepted as an appropriate standard for moral behaviour? On this misunderstanding, it follows that, in situations for which Jewish law contains no clear-cut halakhic instructions, there can be no ethical requirements. And if that’s so, Orthodox Jews making ethical decisions are not going to be guided by the principles that are so important to a Jewish ethical worldview!

All this leads us back to a conclusion of our previous article – namely, we need to learn to better understand Jewish ethics, not just halacha. But the point here is that ethical thinking is not only important in its own right, but as a prerequisite to aligning behaviour of Orthodox Jews with the Torah’s ethical standards.

When Knowing is Not Enough

But this isn’t the end of the matter. After all, many people do study Jewish ethics or, at least, are aware of many Jewish ethical values but still fail to live by them. The Orthodox community’s failure to reach the gold standard in ethical behaviour can’t simply be explained in terms of ignorance.

A parallel to this very phenomenon is discussed in the article I cited at the beginning in which Schwitzgebel reflects on his research into the ethical behaviour of philosophers specialising in ethics.

Schwitzgebel’s research (and that of fellow philosopher Joshua Rust) reveals that “[n]ever once have we found ethicists as a whole behaving better than our comparison group of other professors, by any of our planned measures.” There are some areas – such as vegetarianism and charitable giving – in which ethicists tend to embrace more stringent norms but, even in these areas, their behaviour does not reflect these more stringent standards.

So any question we have about failure to live by avowed ethical principles isn’t confined to Orthodox Jews, it’s clearly a more general human phenomenon. But how should we explain it? Why do people fail to act in accordance with their moral values?

In his critique of Plato’s ethical perspective, Aristotle challenges the assumption that knowledge of good and evil is enough to ensure ethical behaviour. He argues that, in order to motivate moral conduct, this knowledge must become an emotion or a desire for the good, more powerful than any opposing desires.

Approving of this Aristotelian critique, Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits argues that the ethical deed requires not just correct understanding but, foremost, an “appetite for goodness”. Whilst each of us has a yetzer hatov, it is “necessary to foster the emotional force of the desire for the good, to increase its intensity and its hold over the emotional pattern of the human personality.”³

In other words, it’s not enough to know what’s right – you have to care! A person with an acute ethical understanding is not likely to be distinguished by ethically excellent behaviour if he lacks a passion for moral goodness.

To come full circle, it is this very factor which, according to Schwitzgebel, accounts for the lack of exceptional ethical behaviour amongst ethicists. One can develop a cognitive appreciation for the moral necessity of vegetarianism or extraordinary levels of philanthropy but this will only motivate you to act accordingly if you care passionately about morality. Most people, Schwitzgebel suggests, aim for moral mediocrity. “If the morally good life is uncomfortable and unpleasant, it involves repeated painful sacrifices that are not compensated in some way, sacrifices that others are also not making, then we don’t want it.”

So here we have another argument for strengthening our emotional affinity for moral goodness but, again, it’s a different one than we proposed in our last article. It’s not just that feeling ethically is itself part of what it means to have good character. It’s that caring passionately about moral values is what leads us to moral greatness.

The Competition: What Many Really Care About

Discussing the importance of caring about ethics prompts the question of what many people do really care about. What is motivating their behaviour if not ethics? Consider those referred to by R Weinberg and R Cherlow who observe halakha but compromise on Jewish ethical values. If they are cognizant of Jewish values but don’t consider those values operative, what is making them tick? What is driving their behaviour? What are they passionate about?

The answer (obviously varying with each individual) is that they are often driven by those characteristics that come naturally to human beings, particularly those which are accentuated by modern culture.⁴ These include egotism, pursuit of material possessions, the quest for power and sensual satisfaction.

The result of all this is that these goals are what drives and motivates human behaviour, with the caveat that those who are committed to halakha may (try to) restrain themselves so as not to break Jewish law. It seems to me that this is in line with Shapiro’s remarks here and here. In commenting on the occurrence of legal scandals amongst those purporting to be observant Jews, Shapiro writes that if one is only restrained by halakhic compliance and not the broad ethical underpinnings of Judaism then loopholes and halakhic justifications will be found for inappropriate, even illegal activities.

I’ll present my suggestions of what I think should be done about all this in a few months but, for now, it’s important to identify a solid grounding in Jewish ethical thought and a strong passion for moral goodness as prerequisites for the kind of behaviour to which we should be aspiring.

1. Kiddushin 59a
2. Meiri, Commentary to Avot 3:17; Rabbi Joseph Albo, Sefer Ha-Ikkarim 3:23; Rabbi Naftali Zvi Yehudah Berlin, Ha-amek Davar to Shemot 19:6
3. God, Man and History, p.111
4. There are some positive traits which come naturally to human beings and some positive aspects of modern culture but this does not negate my basic point here.