In my previous article, I wrote about the necessity for a renewed and broadened focus on moral education in Jewish communities. In a discussion about the post on the Lookjed Online Discussion Group, Rabbi Dr Barry Kislowicz argued convincingly that we need to define the goals of moral education before developing a strategy to get there. As R Kislowicz notes, there are “a variety of nuanced approaches to understanding the interplay between Torah and ethics”. What follows is the first section of a series of reflections on the goals of moral education from the perspective of the Rambam. Specifically, I will outline the importance he ascribes to the cognitive sphere of moral life.
The Intellectual Component of Moral Development
For the Rambam, correct moral behaviour is not enough. The mitzvah to walk in God’s ways requires us to develop certain character virtues. As the Rambam writes in Sefer Hamitzvot, this mitzvah entails “emulating the good deeds and fine character traits which are used metaphorically to describe God”. This position is codified in the first chapter of Hilkhot De’ot.
What does it mean to have a certain character trait? Certainly, this includes certain emotions, but it also entails developing certain cognitive perspectives.
It should be conceded that some prominent scholars have argued that, for Rambam, walking in God’s ways simply involves emulating His actions. Indeed, this is implied by Rambam in Moreh Hanevuchim I:54 where he notes that God does not have states of mind and that emulating God, at least for the governor of a country, relates only to how one behaves.
Nonetheless, Rambam’s position in Sefer HaMitzvot and Mishneh Torah, referenced above, presents the mitzvah as involving character and not just behaviour. Indeed, Rabbenu Avraham ben HaRambam writes the following in a responsum in which he was called on to explain his father’s position:
“[I]t is possible t think that that [the mitzvah of walking in God’s ways] is not obligatory in the way that the other commandments are obligatory, for they are about action whereas ‘you shall walk in his ways’ concerns character traits (middot)… [Thus character traits are one thing, acts another] despite the fact that the point of these character traits is the actions to which they give rise.”1
Rabbenu Avraham explains that Rambam is presenting an ethic of virtue, not just a set of rules of behaviour. Of importance is not just how one’s behaviour but also one’s character.
Indeed, this same approach is articulated in Hilkhot Teshuvah 7:3:
And you shouldn’t say that teshuvah is only necessary for sins which involve a deed… Just as one needs to do teshuvah for these, so he needs to identify his bad character traits (de’ot ra’ot) and to do teshuvah for them.
Teshuvah is necessary to rectify character flaws and this would require fixing their underlying mindset.
Why does Rambam consider character to be so important?
A Prerequisite for Moral Behaviour
R Avraham writes that “the point of these character traits is the actions to which they give rise”. This indicates that Rambam understood character to be important because of its impact on behaviour. Indeed, in Hilkhot Deot 7:8, Rambam indicates that the purpose of the prohibition against bearing a grudge is that a person is not motivated to take revenge. The mindset of resentment is likely to lead to harmful behaviour and this must be avoided. This is an example of Ramabm’s recognition of the capacity of intellectual perspective to impact on moral behaviour.
Rabbi Dr Jonathan Sacks writes, in reference to Rambam’s approach, that one’s perspective can also impact on the way in which moral behaviour is practiced – not just the doing of the right thing but doing it in the optimum way. He writes that “[w] hen we interact with people, much of what matters has less to do with what we do than how.”2On this understanding of Rambam, character is important because it includes such traits as sensitivity, empathy, integrity and commitment which all impact on the quality of our ethical conduct.
An Intrinsically Valuable Goal
While Rambam does indeed view character development as a foundation for optimum conduct, he also recognises the value of character refinement as an intrinsically valuable goal.
The section of the Mishneh Torah in which Rambam most extensively emphasises the importance of character development is Hilhkot De’ot. The opening five chapters of Hilhkot De’ot make barely any reference to interpersonal behaviour and the more elaborate definition of the mitzvah of loving one’s fellow is saved for another section (Hilkhot Evel 14:1). As Rabbi Dr Walter Wurzburger argues, this intimates Rambam’s understanding of character development as a goal of religious life, independently of its impact on moral behaviour.
Why does the Rambam consider character virtue as a desideratum in its own right?
In Moreh Hanevuchim III:8, Rambam discusses the gemara’s teaching that “thoughts of sin are more difficult (kashin) than sin.” Rambam explains this to mean that thoughts of sin are worse than the actual sinful activity. Rambam understands a person’s mind, and not his body, to be the centre of the human personality. A person who sins with his thoughts has defied the epicentre of his spiritual personality.
For this reason, it is important to develop the correct moral perspectives and attitudes. As Rabbi Dr Joseph B. Soloveitchik explains, Rambam considers the crux of his religious philosophy to be the thesis that thought is the link that connects human beings with God. For the Rambam, “[t]hinking in terms of eternal truths, whether theoretical or ethical, is an act of love, of craving for God.”3 Intellectual understanding of moral principles is a primary means of attaching oneself to the Creator.
The Limits of the Intellect
Despite the value he accords intellectual refinement in the moral life, Rambam warns against regarding the intellect as the sole arbiter of moral truth. In Moreh Hanevuchim I:31, he emphasises the limitations of the human intellect for apprehending certain truths on the basis of which Rabbi Isidore Epstein argues that, for Rambam, “revelation, not reason, is the final arbiter of the truth or falsity of any religious teaching.” This position is even more strongly supported by Moreh Hanevuchim I:34 in which Rambam writes that there are truths which are so difficult, subtle and profound that the masses cannot understand them without revelation. In this context, Rambam’s famous words at the end of Hilkhot Me’ila are most illustrative:
It’s appropriate for a person to contemplate the laws of the holy Torah and to understand them to the extent of his ability. In a case in which he doesn’t find a reason for the law and doesn’t know its purpose, he should not regard it lightly.
Whether or not students should be taught to see themselves as the final arbiters of moral judgment has been a matter of dispute among Jewish educators who have grappled with the tension between moral autonomy and Torah commitment. This discussion of the Rambam may have significant implications for that discussion.
- Responsa Rabbi Abraham ben HaRambam, ed. A.H. Freimann (Jerusalem: Mekize Nirdamim, 1937), no.63, pp.65-8 quoted in Jonathan Sacks, To Heal a Fractured World, p.241-2
- To Heal a Fractured World, p.243
- Worship of the Heart, p.4